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The purpose of this note is to suggest a way to formulate and study the
question of whether asymmetry of buyers (in the sense of having di®erent
prior probability distributions of valuations) is helpful or harmful to the
seller in private-value auctions. Do they generate higher or lower expected
selling revenue than auctions in which buyers are symmetric?
The asymmetry in an auction (which treats the buyers equally such as
the ¯rst or second price auction) can be in the distributions of the buy-
ers' valuations or in the buyers' beliefs. The ¯rst point we make is that
the only meaningful and interesting question about the e®ects on revenue is
with respect to asymmetry of beliefs of the buyers. Distribution of valuations,
whether symmetric or asymmetric, are part of the data of the situation. This
distribution of the state of nature is not controlled by the seller or by us as
analysts. Comparing an asymmetric auction to some benchmark symmetric
auction (with a distribution based upon the asymmetric distributions), can
easily lead to di®erent results, depending on how this benchmark is chosen.
Consider for example a two-buyer, ¯rst-price auction (G;H) where the buy-
ers' valuations v1 and v2 are independently drawn from the distributions G
and H, respectively. If G and H are the uniform distributions on [0;1] and
[2;3], respectively, then clearly the asymmetric auction with (G;H) gener-
ates higher revenue than the symmetric (G;G) auction and lower than the
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1symmetric (H;H) auction.1
The asymmetry of beliefs, on the other hand, are a®ected by the mech-
anism of the auction and may therefore in principle be manipulated by the
seller via the informational structure of the auction. Therefore, our main
methodological message in this note is:
To study the e®ect of asymmetry in auctions, we have to single out the
e®ect of asymmetry of beliefs by comparing two auctions using the same mech-
anism (¯rst price, second price, etc.) and with the same joint distribution
of valuations; they di®er only in the mutual beliefs of the buyers about each
other's valuations. These beliefs are symmetric in one auction and asymmet-
ric in the other.
To illustrate this idea, consider an asymmetric auction (G;H). We would
like to study the e®ect of this asymmetry by considering the following two
versions of ex-ante symmetric auctions.
In both versions, chance chooses with equal probability one of the pairs
(G;H) or (H;G), then uses this pair to choose (independently) the valua-
tions (v1;v2) and inform each buyer of his value. However, while in (s) no
information is given to the buyers until they learn their values, in version
(a) both buyers are informed whether the ¯rst move by chance resulted in
x or in y. Clearly the (a) version is equivalent to conducting one of the two
asymmetric auctions (G;H) or (H;G) with equal probability. So ex-ante
the buyers are symmetric with distribution Fi = 1
2G + 1
2H: This is also the
prior distribution of values for each of the two buyers in game (s). Thus, any
di®erence in revenue between (s) and (a) is due only to asymmetry in beliefs.
However, such comparison is not straightforward since (s) is not equivalent





is easily seen in that given his valuation vi; buyer i's beliefs about the val-
uation of buyer j is not Fj; it is another distribution resulting from Bayes'
formula and depends on vi. Thus, this is not the classic symmetric model of
an auction with independent values in which beliefs of the buyers are com-
mon knowledge.2 So even though the two models di®er only in the mutual
1The symmetric auctions (G;G) and (H;H) yield revenue of 1=3 and 7=3; respectively,
while the asymmetric auction (G;H) yields revenue of 1 (in equilibrium the second buyer
bids 1 and wins).
2This is an asymmetric auction of the type studied by Landsberger et al. [2002], where
the ranking of the valuations becomes common knowledge among buyers, the resulting
situation is not the classical asymmetic auction model since the beliefs of the buyers are
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Figure 1: The symmetric game (s) and the asymmetric game (a).
beliefs of the buyers, this is not the comparison we would like to make, since
we want to be able to compare standard symmetric and asymmetric auction
games (as studied by Maskin and Riley [2000]) in which the beliefs of a buyer
independent of his valuation.
To achieve this, we modify the two models in the following way: we
consider a game in which a chance move ¯rst chooses a pair of distributions





H ¯ 1 ¡ ® ¡ 2¯
where ® ¸ 0;¯ ¸ 0 and ® + 2¯ · 1: Then the buyers' valuations v1 and
v2 are drawn independently from the chosen F1 and F2; respectively.
not common knowledge.
3This captures the previous games as a special case when ® = 0 and
¯ = 1=2 and in addition allows for independent probability distributions
when ® = ¹2 and ¯ = ¹(1 ¡ ¹). This is the case where the buyers' values
are drawn independently from (F1;F2) which are chosen with probabilities:
P(Fi = G) = ¹; P(Fi = H) = 1 ¡ ¹; for i = 1;2 and 0 · ¹ · 1: We
henceforth call this the independent case.
We can now replace the previous games of (s) and (a) by (b s) and (b a)
as shown in Figures 2 and 3. In these ¯gures we make use of information
set notation, that is, in (b s) no buyer is informed of the outcome of the ¯rst
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The asymmetric game (b a):
We thus suggest to compare revenue in the independent case of the two
games (b s) and (b a): we will say that the asymmetry (G;H) enhances (de-
creases) revenue if the revenue for game (b a) is larger (smaller) than that of
game (b s):
² Note ¯rst that in the independent case, both games (b s) and (b a) have the
same joint iid distribution of values (each vi is drawn from distribution
¹G + (1 ¡ ¹)H):
² Model (b s) is a standard, symmetric, independent, private-value auction
(¹G + (1 ¡ ¹)H; ¹G + (1 ¡ ¹)H):
² Model (b a) leads (randomly) to one of the following standard inde-
pendent value auctions: each is an independent, private-value auction
with one of the following joint distributions: (G;G);(H;H);(G;H) or
(H;G). The last two being standard, asymmetric, independent private-
value auctions.
Using the aforementioned points, we can draw the following two observa-
tions about the two games.
5Observation 1: In both games (b s) and (b a), for a second-price auction, it
is a (weakly) dominant strategy to bid one's value. Thus, since the joint
distribution of valuations is the same in (b s) and (b a), the distribution of the
second highest valuation is the same and hence, seller revenue is the same.
Observation 2: By revenue equivalence, in game (b s) the revenue from the
¯rst-price and second-price auctions is the same.
Let us now use these observations to examine an asymmetric auction
studied in the literature with an analytical solution.
Example 1. (Maskin & Riley [2000]) Denote by U[a;b] the uniform distri-
bution on [a,b]. Let G » U[0;1]; H » U[2;3].
² Under the ¯rst-price auction in game (b a), the seller's revenue is (1=3)¹2
+2¹(1 ¡ ¹) + (7=3) (1 ¡ ¹)2:
² Under the second-price auction revenue in game (b a); the seller's revenue
is equal to (1=3)¹2 +¹(1 ¡ ¹) + (7=3) (1 ¡ ¹)2 and is thus lower than
revenue in the ¯rst-price auction.
² The seller's revenue in the second price auction is the expected second
highest value. Hence, it is the same in games (b a) and (b s) since the
distribution of valuations is the same (Observation 1).
² Since revenue is equivalent between ¯rst and second price auctions in
game (b s) (Observation 2), revenue in the ¯rst-price auction in game (b s)
is equal to revenue in the second-price auction of game (b a) and thus
lower than the revenue in a ¯rst-price auction in game (b a):
² We conclude that revenue from a ¯rst-price auction is always higher in
game (b a) than in game (b s): asymmetry increases revenue:
Note that the prior distribution in Harsanyi's model (¹;1 ¡ ¹) do not
a®ect the results as long as 0 < ¹ < 1: This is not a speci¯city of this
example but rather a feature of the proposed approach. If the Harsanyi
model is the right framework to make the comparison, then the result should
not depend on probability distribution of the information that renders the
6situation asymmetric. Whether the asymmetry of (G;H) hurts or helps the
seller should not depend upon its frequency of occurrence.
Example 2. Denote by ±(x) the degenerate distribution with mass one at
x. Let G = ±(3) and H = 1
2U[0;1] + 1
2 ±(3): 3
² In the equilibrium of the ¯rst-price auction in game b a, buyer 1 bids 1
with probability 1=2 and with probability 1=2 uses a mixed-strategy
with cumulative distribution W(b) = 2=(3 ¡ b) ¡ 1 on [1;2]: Buyer 2
bids his value when it is less than or equal to 1 and when his value is
3; he uses a mixed strategy with cumulative distribution W(b):
² The expected revenue in the ¯rst-price auction of (G;H) is 1:5: 4
² The expected revenue in the second-price auction of (G;H) is 1:75.
² Thus, the expected revenue in the ¯rst-price auction of game (b a) is
3¹2+1:5¹(1¡¹)+ 13
12 (1 ¡ ¹)
2 and the expected revenue in the second-
price auction of game (b s) is 3¹2 + 1:75¹(1 ¡ ¹) + 13
12 (1 ¡ ¹)
2 :
² Therefore, using similar logic as in example 1, we conclude that revenue
from a ¯rst-price auction is always lower in game (b a) than in game (b s):
asymmetry reduces revenue.:
The above two examples indicates an interesting relationship between
two revenue comparisons. One (as done in Maskin & Riley) is comparing
the revenue between ¯rst and second price asymmetric auctions. The other
(as addressed in Cantillon [2000]) is comparing the revenue in symmetric
and asymmetric ¯rst-price auctions. By our approach, based on these two
examples, we see that these two revenue comparisons are closely related: the
asymmetry generates higher revenue in ¯rst-price auctions if and only if the
asymmetric auction generates more revenue with a ¯rst-price auction than
3This example is inspired by an example in Maskin & Riley [2000] where one buyer has
a value of 2 and the other buyer half the time has a value of 0 and half the time has a value
of 2. We did not use their original example since if bids are restricted to be non-negative,
that auction has no equilibrium.
4This is a derived by straightforward computation noticing that if bi » W; i = 1;2;
and bi are independent then E[bi] = 3 ¡ 2Ln(2) and E[maxfb1;b2g] = 4Ln(2) ¡ 1:
7with a second-price auction. This is in fact a general result as established by
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The asymmetry of (G;H) enhances revenue of the seller if
and only if in the asymmetric auction (G;H) the expected revenue from the
¯rst-price auction RFP(G;H) is higher than that of the second-price auction
RSP(G;H) .
Proof: Since in games (b a) and (b s) values are drawn from the same dis-
tribution, revenue from a second-price auction is the same in both games
(Observation 1). In the game (b s), the revenue equivalence holds due to inde-
pendence. Hence, the revenue of a second-price auction in game (b a) equals
revenue of a ¯rst-price auction in (b s) (Observation 2). Therefore, the ranking
of revenue of the ¯rst price auction in (b a) and (b s) is the same as the ranking
of revenue between ¯rst and second price auction in the game (b a): To see this
ranking observe that when beliefs are symmetric, the revenue is the same in
¯rst and second price auctions in the subgames of (b a). Thus, any revenue
di®erence between the ¯rst and second price auctions in game (b a) comes only
from the subgames when the beliefs are asymmetric, i.e. one buyer's value
comes from G and the other buyer's value comes from H (and this is common
knowledge). Therefore, if this asymmetric case, the second-price auction has
greater revenue than in the ¯rst-price auction, the same revenue comparison
is valid for the game (b a); and vis-versa. Therefore, the ranking of revenue
between a ¯rst-price auction and a second-price auction in the asymmet-
ric auction (G;H) determines the ranking of revenue between a ¯rst-price
auction in game (b a) and a ¯rst-price auction in game (b s): ¥
Corollary: The revenue ranking of the symmetric auction (b s) and the asym-
metric auction (b a) is the same for all 0 · ¹ · 1:
This result indicates that for an auction (G;H) where the RFP(G;H) >
RSP(G;H), it is worthwhile for the seller to release information (about dis-
tributions of valuations) in the game (b s) so as to generate an asymmetry
of beliefs. Likewise, when RFP(G;H) < RSP(G;H), it is worthwhile for
the seller to keep this information secret so as to maintain the symmetry
of the buyers' beliefs. This is a result in the °avor of Milgrom & Weber's
[1982] linkage principle addressing the revenue e®ect of the seller releasing
his private information.
8This proposition, in conjunction with Maskin and Riley's results are in
contrast with the conclusion of Cantillon [2000] that asymmetry is disad-
vantageous to the seller. As the above two examples show, the asymmetry
(F1;F2) may be advantageous or disadvantageous to the seller even if we re-
strict attention to CSD comparable distributions, i.e. (Fs;Fw) such that Fs
conditionally stochastically dominates Fw. 5
The di®erence in results follows clearly from the di®erence of the two
approaches: Cantillon compares an asymmetric model (F1;F2) with the




F1F2): These two models do not cor-
respond to the same joint distribution of valuations.6 Hence, we argue, the
di®erence between the two models is due to both the di®erence of value dis-
tributions and the di®erence in mutual beliefs.
To extend our results to the case where in the symmetric model (b s);
(v1;v2) are not independent, we need to view (b s) as a more general Milgrom
& Weber model, which involves the notion of a±liation:
The distribution of (v1;v2) with positive density f(v1;v2) is said to be
(strictly) a±liated if for each v = (v1;v2); v = (v1;v2) the following inequality
holds:
f(v _ v)f(v ^ v) > f(v)f(v)
Where _ and ^ denote respectively the coordinate wise maximum and min-
imum of the two vectors, respectively. When the opposite inequality holds,
we say that (v1;v2) are (strictly) negatively a±liated. Although it was not
mentioned explicitly in Milgrom & Weber, it was noticed (see for example
Mathews [1987]) that their results extend to the case of negative a±liation
namely:
(Theorem 15 of Milgrom & Weber) [With a±liation] the expected selling
price in the second-price auction is at least as large as in the ¯rst-price
auction.
(Extension of Theorem 15 of Milgrom & Weber) With negative a±liation
5Distribution Fs conditionally stochastically dominates Fw if for any x < y (for which




Fw(y) (see Maskin & Riley2000).
6The speci¯c choice of the distribution
p
F1F2 was to guarantee the same distribution of
the highest valuations and hence the same distribution of surplus in both models. However,
for instance, the distribution of the second highest valuation is not the same. In fact as
Cantillon shows, the expected revenue of the second-price auctions is not the same.
9the expected selling price in the ¯rst-price auction is at least as large as in
the second-price auction.
To address the issue of a±liation in our model (b s), we make use of the
notion of MLR (Monotone Likelihood Ratio). The distributions (G;H) are
related by MLR if g(x)=h(x) is increasing or h(x)=g(x) is increasing. We note
that this relationship implies CSD: if g(x)=h(x) is increasing, then G con-
ditionally stochastically dominates H;which in turn implies G stochastically
dominates H:7
Lemma If (G;H) are related by MLR then
(i) if (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® < 0 then (v1;v2) are a±liated.
(ii) if (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® > 0 then (v1;v2) are negatively a±liated.
(iii) (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® = 0 if and only if (v1;v2) are independent
Proof: Let (v1;v2) and (v1;v2) s.t. v1 > v1 and v2 < v2: Assuming that G
and H have positive densities g and h respectively, then the joint distribution
of (v1;v2) in game (b s) (as well as in game (b a)) is f(v1;v2) given by
f(v1;v2) = ®g(v1)g(v2)+¯g(v1)h(v2)+¯h(v1)g(v2)+(1¡®¡2¯)h(v1)h(v2)
A su±cient condition for strict a±liation is
f(v1;v2)f(v1;v2) > f(v1;v2)f(v1;v2)
which yields through straightforward manipulation
((® + ¯)
2 ¡ ®)[g(v1)h(v1) ¡ g(v1)h(v1)] ¢ [g(v2)h(v2) ¡ g(v2)h(v2)] > 0
When (G;H) are related by MLR, in the above inequality the two ex-
pressions in [¢¢¢][¢¢¢] have opposite signs, hence when (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® < 0 the
inequality holds.
Likewise, the condition for strict negative a±liation is just the reverse
sign of a±liation
f(v1;v2)f(v1;v2) < f(v1;v2)f(v1;v2)
7To see that MLR is stronger than CSD consider the following example of distributions
on [0;1]: h(x) = 1 and g(x) = 3x for x · 1=2 and g(x) = 2 ¡ x for x > 1=2. Note that
H(x)=G(x) is increasing, but h(x)=g(x) is not increasing.
10Which is true when (G;H) are related by MLR and (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® > 0:
Part (iii) holds since (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® = 0 can be rewritten as ¯ =
p
® ¡ ® and
if we let ® = ¹2; then ¯ = ¹(1 ¡ ¹): ¥
The comparison of ¯rst-price auction in (b s) and (b a) is now given by the
following:
Proposition 2: If in games (b s) and (b a); G and H are MLR then:
(i) if (® +¯)2 ¡ ® > 0 and RFP (G;H) < RSP (G;H) then the ¯rst price
revenue in (b a) is lower than the ¯rst-price revenue in (b s); that is RFP (b a) <
RFP (b s) (and thus is to the advantage of the seller to reveal information in
order to induce such asymmetric beliefs).
(ii) if (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® < 0 and RFP (G;H) > RSP (G;H) then the ¯rst
price revenue in (b a) is higher than the ¯rst-price revenue in (b s); that is
RFP (b a) < RFP (b s) (and thus is to the advantage of the seller to keep such
information secret).
(iii) if (®+¯)2 ¡® = 0 and RFP (G;H)(>;=;<) RSP (G;H); then the
¯rst price revenue in (b a) is respectively (>,=,<) the ¯rst-price revenue in (b s)
that is RFP (b a) (<;=;<) RFP (b s) (this is case was covered before and does
not depend upon the relationship of G and H).
Proof:
Part (iii) is a restatement of Proposition 1, while parts (i) and (ii) are
proved in a similar manner and sketched as follows (
MW =) stands for `implied
by Milgrom & Weber'):
(® + ¯)
2 ¡ ® > 0
| {z }
G and H are related by MLR | {z } (® + ¯)






=) (v1;v2) are negatively a±liated
MW =) RFP (b s) > RSP (b s) = RSP (b a):





=) (v1;v2) are a±liated
MW =) RFP (b s) < RSP (b s) = RSP (b a):
So if RFP (G;H) > RSP (G;H) then RFP (b a) > RSP (b a) =) RFP (b s) <
RFP (b a): ¥
11Note that the above proposition covers only part of the possible cases:
no general conclusion can be made for the cases (i') if (® +¯)2 ¡ ® > 0 and
RFP (G;H) > RSP (G;H) and (ii') if (® + ¯)2 ¡ ® < 0 and RFP (G;H) <
RSP (G;H): It is plausible that in these cases, the ranking can be in either
direction.
Concluding Remarks
Among the interesting questions asked regarding the seller revenue in auc-
tions are the following:
1. Is the asymmetry of buyers distributions helpful or harmful to the seller
(asked by Cantillon [2000])?
2. When the buyers have asymmetric distributions is the ¯rst-price auc-
tion better than the second price auction (asked by Maskin and Riley
[2000])?
3. Can a seller can enhance his revenue by releasing information (Milgrom
and Weber [1982])?
In this paper we addressed the ¯rst question and made the point that
the appropriate comparison of revenue should be between models with the
same distribution of values but one symmetric in beliefs while the other
asymmetric in beliefs. An example of such an asymmetric model is provided
in Landsberger et al. [2002] where the asymmetry of beliefs is generated by
making common knowledge the ranking of the buyers' valuations.8
To study the e®ect of the asymmetry of two distribution of valuations
(G;H), we propose two Harsanyi game models of incomplete information (b a)
and (b s). Since by construction the two models have the same distributions
of valuations, the second-price auction has the same revenue in both games,
we thus use the ¯rst-price auction for the revenue comparison. In doing so,
we ¯nd that the results hinge on the answer to the above second question.
8For a class of initial symmetric distributions (including the uniform), they found that
in the ¯rst-price auction this asymmetry enhances revenue.
12Furthermore, since the release of information to the buyers in the model (b s)
induces the model (b a), the results are naturally related to the third question,
namely, if this additional information is known by the seller.9
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